수익공유계약, 환매계약, 단순선형가격계약에 관한 대면 행동 실험 연구

Revenue sharing contracts and buyback contracts are designed to address the double-marginalization problem that may occur when simple linear price contracts are used in supply chains. Double-marginalization refers to the phenomenon where companies in a supply chain are less profitable when separated into individual entities than when integrated into a single company. In the supply chain literature, various means were proposed to overcome double-marginalization. Among these, revenue-sharing contracts and buyback contracts are widely studied. In the revenue-sharing contract, the supplier earns additional revenue from the sales of the retailer besides the initial wholesale revenue. In the buyback contract, the retailer can resell its leftover inventories to the supplier. While these two contracts appear superficially different, mathematically they are equivalent. For a given parameter set of the revenue-sharing contract, an equivalent parameter set for the buyback contract can be constructed to provide the same amount of cash flow in every situation. It has alson been theoretically shown that the performance of revenue-sharing contracts and buyback contracts are higher than that of simple linear price contracts. However, prior behavioral research has also indicated that real people make different decisions than the theory predicts. In practice, revenue sharing contracts and buyback contracts are not as frequently used and the reason can be traced back to the fact that the decision-making in practice might be different from the one predicted by theory. There have been many behavioral experiments with various settings on supply chain contracts. In particular, subjects had to make decisions without knowing who the other party of the contract is or the other party was a computer. Those settings were deliberately composed to focus on specific aspects of real-world supply chain, but they did not reflect the fact that two decision makers of the contract may know each other. In this study, we experimentally explore how subjects taking the roles as wholesalers and retailers make decisions about the three contracts, especially in face-to-face situations. The experiment was conducted on undergraduate students. Two subjects made one group and each of them took the role of the supplier and the retailer. The groups were allowed to make face-to-face communication. The demand was assumed to follow the discrete uniform distribution from 1 to 20 and the consumer price of the product was given as 12. The production cost was given as 3. No salvage value was assumed. The same group went through the experiment for the simple linear contract, the revenue-sharing contract and the buyback contract. Overall, there were two separate experiments and in each of them, the sequence of the contracts that the subjects are exposed to was altered to figure out the possibility of the learning effect. In the first experiment, the subjects encountered the simple linear contract - the revenue-sharing contract – the buyback contract and the subjects in the second one encountered the simple linear constract – the buyback contract - the revenue-sharing contract. For each of the contracts, 10 stages of contracting game were executed and hence overall the subjects went through 30 stages. Following the tradition of supply chain contract literature, we assume that the supplier first determines the parameters of the contract and next, the retailer determines the inventory to purchase in each of the stages. The uncertain demand is realized after all the players determined their parameters and the resulting profit for each of the player is calculated. In the next stage, the supplier and the retailer adjusted their parameters and encountered the new demand. All the subjects went through the basic education of the newsvendor model before the experiments. Nine hypotheses regarding the performances of the contracts are constructed. We observed that double-marginalization problem is less severe than is predicted for simple linear price contracts and wholesale prices are set below the optimal level for revenue-sharing contracts and above for buyback contracts. Overall profitability is observed to be greater for buyback contracts than for revenue-sharing contracts, and also retailers preferred buyback contracts.