개인 지배주주가 자사주 매입에 미치는 영향

This study examines whether controlling shareholders who are individual increases the likelihood of share repurchase and analyzes how motivations related to income tax for individual controlling shareholders enhance this possibility. Furthermore, it directly investigates the relationship between individual controlling shareholders and the methods of share repurchases, a subject not previously explored. When classifying a company’s shareholders into controlling and minority shareholders, controlling shareholders are known to be more passive towards share repurchases based on the expropriation hypothesis. When categorizing shareholders into individual and non-individual, individual shareholders tend to favor share repurchases due to the favorable tax policy for share repurchases compared to dividend income tax. However, there has yet to be direct research on whether controlling shareholders, particularly individual shareholders, are more motivated to engage in share repurchases due to the impact of potential disadvantages in dividend income taxation. This study addresses this gap in the existing literature. The analysis results show that as the influence of individual controlling shareholders increases, the likelihood of share repurchases also increases, and this positive relationship is strengthened when the disadvantage of dividend income tax is greater. On the other hand, as the influence of individual controlling shareholders increases, a preference for direct repurchase methods when acquiring treasury stock becomes evident. These results suggest that it is necessary to consider various motives from various perspectives when analyzing the motives of controlling shareholders’ decisions to stock repurchase. This is because the controlling shareholder in the Korean capital market is composed of various combinations, such as the largest shareholder and related parties. Key Words : stock repurchase, controlling shareholder, individual shareholder, dividend tax penalty