흔하지 않은 이름의 최고경영자와 기업의 연구개발 투자: 최고경영자 특성의 조절 효과를 중심으로

Purpose - The purpose of this study was to examine the relationship between CEO name uncommonness and R&D intensity while focusing on CEO ownership and CEO tenure as moderators of the relationship. Design/methodology/approach - This study collected data from various American databases such as national data on given names from Social Security Administration, COMPUSTAT, and Execucomp. The sample of this study includes 2,494 (firm-year) observations from U.S. firms between 2005-2011. This study conducts Feasible Generalized Least Square (FGLS) regression analysis to test the hypotheses. Findings - First, we found CEO name uncommonness was positively related to R&D intensity. In other words, CEOs with unusual names prefer being distinctive by increasing R&D investments. Second, we examine the moderating roles of CEO characteristics (i.e., CEO ownership and tenure). The results show that CEO tenure strengthens the positive relationship between CEO name uncommonness and R&D intensity. Research implications or Originality - First, this study extends the CEO characteristics and R&D literature by investigating how CEO name uncommonness affects R&D intensity. In addition, our study also supports the intitutionalization of CEO power arguments by showing that CEOs with unusual names are more likely to pursue distinctive strategies when they have longer tenure. For practical implications, our results allow the investors to better predict corporate future R&D expenses. It suggests that ceteris paribus, CEOs with unusual names, vis-a-vis CEOs with common names, are more likely to increase R&D expenses.