Alleviating the Agency Problem:Empirical Evidence on General Counsels in Top Management and Narcissistic CEOs
Alleviating the Agency Problem:Empirical Evidence on General Counsels in Top Management and Narcissistic CEOs
오슬기(연세대학교 박사과정); 김고운(연세대학교 박사과정); 김종환(연세대학교)
23권 3호, 33~68쪽
초록
[Purpose]This study examines whether general counsels (GCs) in top management (TM) alleviate the agency problem of narcissistic CEOs. [Methodology]We employ data from S&P 1500 listed firms and earnings conference calls data for each CEO for measuring CEO narcissism, obtained from S&P Capital IQ, spanning the years 2012 to 2018. [Findings]This study finds that the presence of GCs in TM significantly alleviates pay disparity and excess pay associated with narcissistic CEOs. However, pay disparity and excess pay tend to increase as GCs are paid more, as the higher compensation may indicate an interest alignment between CEOs and GCs. [Implications]This study contributes to expanding the empirical evidence for the monitoring role of GCs and the agency problem associated with narcissistic CEOs.
Abstract
[Purpose]This study examines whether general counsels (GCs) in top management (TM) alleviate the agency problem of narcissistic CEOs. [Methodology]We employ data from S&P 1500 listed firms and earnings conference calls data for each CEO for measuring CEO narcissism, obtained from S&P Capital IQ, spanning the years 2012 to 2018. [Findings]This study finds that the presence of GCs in TM significantly alleviates pay disparity and excess pay associated with narcissistic CEOs. However, pay disparity and excess pay tend to increase as GCs are paid more, as the higher compensation may indicate an interest alignment between CEOs and GCs. [Implications]This study contributes to expanding the empirical evidence for the monitoring role of GCs and the agency problem associated with narcissistic CEOs.
- 발행기관:
- 한국관리회계학회
- 분류:
- 회계학