사업장 근로감독의 실효성 제고 방안 : 행동경제학적 대안을 중심으로

The enforcement of labor protection laws is mostly carried out through labor inspection. Labor inspection uses criminal justice as the final means and solves problems through relatively flexible means such as labor inspection and administrative guidance. Workplace supervision is the most core means of the labor inspection system, and the problem of workplace supervision system today is the low number of detections and detection rates. Such a low level of supervision results makes it difficult to expect a negative effect from labor inspection and may weaken a company's will to voluntarily comply with labor laws. This paper examines policy applications regarding labor inspection from a behavioral economics perspective. In particular, it is revealed that the causes and problems of inefficiency and ineffectiveness of workplace supervision lie in the operation of the labor supervision system. The non- face-to-face ‘electronic approval’ method of the Labor-Management Nuri System of the Ministry of Employment and Labor is causing the side effect of making decision-making through mutual communication difficult and the internal control system not functioning during the supervision process. In addition, the ‘complete correction’ system in the workplace supervision process is highly likely to limit the detection of minor violations of law that are easy to correct or to avoid detection altogether due to work burden, evaluation, etc. Through a soft intervention or intervention approach called ‘nudge’ in behavioral economics, it is possible to increase the number of detections and detection rates, thereby improving the effectiveness of workplace supervision.