한국 재벌기업집단 지배가족의 경영참여와 내부자본시장을 활용한 과잉투자: 지배가족 유형에 따른 조절효과 검증

This study investigates the ruling family management participation and internal capital market’s overinvestment in Korean Chaebol business groups using panel data on total 3,902 Korean listed firms. The analysis period was from 2002 to 2022. The results of the empirical analysis are summarized as follows. It was confirmed that the internal capital market acts as an incentive for overinvestment in the Korean chaebol business group. However, it was found that when the head of business groups participated in management, the problem of overinvestment using the internal capital market decreased. These results could be understood that inefficient decision-making, such as overinvestment in a particular company, could negatively affect other affiliates belonging to the same business group, resulting in the head of business groups limiting the incentives of such overinvestment. On the other hand, the analysis was conducted by dividing it into management participation of the entire ruling family and participation in management of the ruling family excluding the head of the business group, but the moderating effect on the problem of overinvestment using the internal capital market could not be confirmed. The ownership and control of the Korean chaebol business group were concentrated on the head of the business group, so it could be understood that the controlling family other than the head could not exert a significant influence on the entire business group.