기술탈취문제에 대한 시장경쟁자의 전략: 선두주자와 후발주자의 진화게임을 중심으로

In this study, we set up an evolutionary game model between two parties in a situation where a leader and a latecomer enter the same market using the leader's technology, and derive the conditions for satisfying the replication dynamic equation and Lyapunov stability, an evolutionarily stable strategy is determined. Latecomers steal the leader's technology, causing damage to the leader. In this case, the stable equilibrium state between two parties depends on how advantageous the leader is in litigation: the leader does not file a lawsuit and the latecomer chooses to seize the technology, the leader files a lawsuit but the latecomer induces a settlement during the lawsuit, or the leader files a lawsuit but the latecomer chooses to seize the technology. At this time, the settlement amount depends on the market size, litigation costs, technology fees, and damages. This study explains that as the probability of victory of the leader increases, the strategy of the leader filing a lawsuit and the latecomer reaching a settlement is an evolutionarily stable strategy, so that the leader and the latecomer can coexist while it will contribute to protecting the leader's position.