공공선택론의 시각에서 본 한국의 기업결합정책 — 대한항공⋅아시아나항공 사례 —

Despite clear policy objectives aimed at preventing excessive market concentration and distortion, the implementation of merger control by the Korean government sometimes results in decisions that do not optimally enhance market competition and public welfare. This discrepancy is illustrated by historical cases such as Hyundai/Kia and more recent examples like Korean Air/Asiana Airlines. Existing studies, primarily based on public interest theory, do not adequately explain the observed pattern of suboptimal decision-making in the government's merger policy actions. This study proposes a different perspective focusing on the decision-making process to uncover reasons and mechanisms for this pattern. It adopts public choice theory—specifically, rational choice institutionalism—to explore the decision-making behind contentious merger and acquisition policy decisions, with a particular focus on the Korean Air/Asiana Airlines merger as a case study. The findings suggest that the main actors within the government's decision-making framework for the Korean Air/Asiana Airlines merger made rational choices within their institutional constraints, but the cumulative impact of these decisions resulted in suboptimal outcomes. The study concludes that similar patterns have occurred in past problematic cases and, without significant institutional improvements, are likely to recur in future large-scale mergers. It proposes several institutional reforms aimed at enhancing a whole-of-government effort, ensuring the independence of Korea's competition authority, and broadening the scope for third-party interventions in government decision-making on mergers.