한국형 대통령제의 구조적 특징에 관한 연구- 의원내각제적 요소를 중심으로 -

In the presidential system (or modified presidential system), which is a dual structure of democratic legitimacy, it is a natural principle to require separation of powers for checks and balances between powers. However, questions and points have always been raised as to whether the principle of checks and balances is being implemented properly in Korea, which adopts a modified presidential system from the 1948 Constitution to the current Constitution (except for the Second Republic). Despite this criticism, the topic of Korea’s unique government form and separation of powers is already regarded as an abandoned discussion in the name of “a unique political system that has been established through a number of friction” in academia and politics. Moreover, this topic is only used as a knife (tool) to scratch opponents when political power intensifies, and when time passes or a regime change occurs, it is again being regarded as only a loopy and disordered theoretical discussion. The researcher is very sorry for this behavior and wrote this paper to re-form a constructive discourse that fits the principle aspect and examines the advantages that the current structure seeks to pursue. First of all, even if it does not conform to the systematic suitability of the presidential system, it would be reasonable to maintain these elements if the parliamentary cabinet system itself had a positive function that contributed to the principles of the presidential system. Therefore, although the ‘national prime minister system’ requires supplementation in terms of responsibility and authority, it seems that it should be maintained considering that the pure function of the system can contribute to the spirit of the presidential system. It would also be reasonable to maintain and strengthen the ‘right to dismiss prime ministers and state members of the National Assembly’, which has the positive function of keeping the president and the government in check while seeking political responsibility, as in the current system. On the other hand, in a situation where concerns over the imperial presidential system are intensifying, the “right to submit government bills” that can cause the government to concentrate on power are in conflict with the principle of separation of powers, so in principle, it is considered reasonable to take the step of abolishing them. Considering the practical aspect, the abolition theory can be a premature attempt, so discussions should be continued after attempts to improve the capacity of the National Assembly to specialize in legislation and come up with solutions at the same time. Finally, allowing members of the National Assembly to hold concurrent positions as members of the State Council, which is contrary to the principle of separation of powers that each power must achieve mutual checks and controls, and causes practical problems, should be abolished through improvement of awareness of those with authority to revise the Constitution and the law and revision of the law. All of the above-mentioned problems must be preceded by raising awareness of the political world and academia. It is necessary to put down one’s personal or partisan interests for a while and recognize the institutional conformity and practical side effects of the political system. We hope that through dialogue and compromise, discourse and political culture will be formed that can solve the fundamental and practical problems arising from Korea’s unique form of government.