게임 플랫폼에서의 시장획정에 대한 연구 -EPIC v. Apple 사건을 중심으로-

Apple’s move to remove Epic from its platform appears to be anti-competitive. Nevertheless, the U.S. court did not consider Apple’s actions to be a violation of antitrust law. The decisive reason can be found in market definition. This case has important implications for market definition in the platform market. In the United States, precedents recognizing ‘single market approach’ have been accumulating since the Amex ruling regarding market definition relating to the platform. These discussions in the United States can be introduced and utilized in our country as well. However, in order to introduce such a theory when defining the market, a close academic review of its applicability is necessary. In the Epic decision, there was a sharp conflict between the economists with big name having global influence in the area arguing that market definition should be based on the Kodak ruling and Amex ruling for determining anti-competitive behavior on the platform. The market definition in this case requires research and analysis from our perspective. If the market definition method in this Epic case is overly generalized, it may be difficult to prove anticompetitive effect, which may lead to and deepen under-enforcement of the anti-monopoly activities of gatekeeper platforms. Given that the negative effects of antitrust actions can become irreversibly fixed in a short period of time due to the unique concentration effect in the platform market, a cautious approach is needed in applying the single market theory in the Amex ruling in enforcing the competition laws on gatekeeper platforms.