왜 로비가 아니라 사회적 협의를 지속하는가?: 사회적 학습을 통한 노사정의 전략적 선택

Based on the strategic chose and social learning analysis framework, this study found that Korea’s social concertation system continued even after 2000 when the economic crisis was released. As a result of the study, in the process of repeated social concertations related to the issue of working hours and non­regular workers since 2000, the shared knowledge of the labor, management, government, and parliamentary parties acted on the formation of institutions and regulations, resulting in slow but phased policy changes. Despite the weakening of the government’s policy control over the parliament, the labor, management responded to the legislative activities of the parliament in connection with social concertations rather than lobbying. The strategy was divided into two types. First, even if they cannot agree at the corporate level, it is a type of inducing consensus legislation between the ruling and opposition parties based o repeated social concertations at the parliamentary level. Such an example is the working time reduction bill, which can be characterized by a ‘weak linkage type’. Second, it is a type of method in which the labor, management, and government induce consensus legislation between the ruling and opposition parties based on repeated social concertations, but use the agreement between the labor, management, and government based on justification. As such, the non­regular worker bill can be classified as a ‘strong linkage type’. Despite the various differences, the two cases show that the labor, management, and government, and the ruling and opposition parties recognized the legitimacy and usefulness of social concertation through social learning and strategically chose social concertation rather than lobbying.