Lawyer's Incentive Contract in Arbitration : A Signaling Approach
Lawyer's Incentive Contract in Arbitration : A Signaling Approach
권준엽(School of Business Administration, Kyungpook National University); 김성룡(Department of Commerce and Trade, Kyungpook National University)
34권 3호, 127~142쪽
초록
This study suggests a signaling game model between the claimant and the lawyer. To convince the lawyer’s ability to the claimant, the lawyer has incentive to send a credible signal to the lawyer. We adopt the lawyer’s public relations as a signaling device. Taking advantage of lower marginal cost on public relations, the high type lawyer can separate himself from the low type one. We derive perfect Bayesian equilibria of the signaling game and refine them with a unique equilibrium by invoking Intuitive Criterion of Cho and Kreps(1987). Then we characterize the refined equilibrium.
Abstract
This study suggests a signaling game model between the claimant and the lawyer. To convince the lawyer’s ability to the claimant, the lawyer has incentive to send a credible signal to the lawyer. We adopt the lawyer’s public relations as a signaling device. Taking advantage of lower marginal cost on public relations, the high type lawyer can separate himself from the low type one. We derive perfect Bayesian equilibria of the signaling game and refine them with a unique equilibrium by invoking Intuitive Criterion of Cho and Kreps(1987). Then we characterize the refined equilibrium.
- 발행기관:
- 한국중재학회
- 분류:
- 무역학