임원 보수의 하방경직성: 미등기 지배주주의 보수는 덜 삭감되는가?

This study analyzes the sticky behavior of executive compensation for registered and unregistered controlling shareholders using individual executives’ pay information, which has been publicly disclosed on corporate annual reports since 2018. Based on empirical analysis of firms listed on KOSPI from 2019 to 2021, we find that the degree of executive compensation stickiness for unregistered controlling shareholders is significantly higher than that for registered controlling shareholders. This result implies that when controlling shareholders serve as unregistered executives, who have influence on management activities but relatively ambiguous legal responsibilities for their decisions, there can be a moral hazard problem where they prioritize personal gain over the overall benefit of the company. Additionally, when analyzing only the firms affiliated with the Large business groups designated by the FTC, we find no evidence of stickiness of executive compensation for unregistered controlling shareholders. It suggests that compensation structures of the firms affiliated with the Large business groups appear to be designed in a way that executive compensation is closely linked to management performance, due to their high political costs. Compared to prior research on executive compensation that focused solely on registered executives, this study extends the analysis to unregistered executives.