온라인 플랫폼 분야의 부당공동행위에 대한 소고 - 2개 단기 구인구직 플랫폼의 부당공동행위 건 사례를 중심으로 -

This study examines the enforcement of competition law in the online platform sector, specifically focusing on unlawful cartels. It analyzes the 2023 decision by the Korea Fair Trade Commission (KFTC) regarding collusion between two online short-term job platforms, highlighting the competition law issues arising from free services and their subsequent transition to paid models. Through this analysis, the potential for cartel behavior in oligopolistic markets with multiple platform operators is explored, particularly during the shift from free to paid services, where platforms may be incentivized to collude in order to prevent user churn and maintain market stability. This underscores the need for a more proactive approach by competition authorities to address such risks. Additionally, the distinctive characteristics of online platforms—such as free services, multi-sided markets, and the dynamic nature of platform competition—are considered in relation to the legal assessment of cartel behavior. These features were not central to the KFTC’s decision, which primarily focused on the clear consumer welfare harm resulting from price increases following collusion. Beyond price-fixing, online platforms may engage in collusion in various other forms that can produce different types of anti-competitive effects. For example, the assessment of cartel conduct should distinguish between collusion that directly harms consumer welfare through price increases and collusion that weakens competition in the market through exclusionary practices or other structural effects. In conclusion, the current competition law framework, which distinguishes between “hard” and “soft” cartels based on the nature of the agreement (whether it concerns price or other terms), requires further refinement. A more detailed and context-sensitive approach is needed to address the variety of anti-competitive behaviors that may arise in the online platform sector.