재벌 계열사의 위치와 재무분석가 이익예측오차

[Purpose]The role of chaebol－affiliated firms, used by the controlling shareholder to strengthen control over the affiliates, can be represented by their centrality. However, measuring centrality can be difficult due to ownership structures that involve circular shareholding and the methods employed to evaluate control rights. The position of chaebol affiliates, measured by the distance between the controlling shareholder and the affiliates, indicates the extent of control the shareholder exerts over the affiliated companies. Therefore, this study analyzes the effect of position of chaebol－affiliated firms on financial analysts’ forecast errors. [Methodology]We sampled manufacturing firms listed on the KOSPI market from 2001 to 2014, as designated by the Fair Trade Commission’s large business groups. Using social network analysis and Matlab, we measured the position of the chaebol－affiliated company defined by Almeida et al.(2011). The position is closer to a value of 1 when an affiliated－firm is located higher in the pyramid ownership structure, indicating a shorter distance to the controlling shareholder. Whereas the position exceeds 1 when the affiliated－firm is situated lower in the pyramid, reflecting a greater distance from the controlling shareholder. We perform multiple regression analysis to examine the effect of the affiliated－firm’s position on financial analysts’ forecast errors. [Findings]We find that the position of chaebol－affiliated company has a significant negative effect on the financial analysts’ forecast errors. This test result implies that as the distance between the affiliated firm and controlling shareholder increases, i.e., when the affiliated company is positioned lower in the pyramid ownership structure, the earnings forecast error by financial analysts decreases. [PolicyImplications]This study makes a significant contribution by addressing the limitations of ownership－based measures in evaluating the control exercised by controlling shareholders over affiliated companies within chaebol’s complex circular ownership and pyramid governance structures. Assessing the degree of control of controlling shareholders over affiliated companies by the position relative to the controlling shareholder, this study moves beyond traditional ownership metrics. Additionally, the study broadens the analysis of the agency problem between minority and controlling shareholders by investigating how the control of affiliates by controlling shareholders affects the earnings forecast errors of financial analysts. The research also provides a clearer understanding of agency problem issue from the perspective of corporate stakeholders. Furthermore, the empirical findings offer valuable insights for policymakers in developing regulations related to chaebols.