헤겔의 『법철학』에서 ‘양심적 병역 거부’의 정당화 문제

We can confirm from the reference to ‘Quakers’ and ‘Anabaptists’ in § 270 of ‘Philosophy of Right’ that Hegel was already aware of the situation in which some believers refused war and military service based on ‘pacifism’ and that he not only considered the ‘alternative service system’ but also considered it as an important issue in the ‘relationship between the state and religion’. In addition, the ‘alternative military service system’ is closely related to the issue of individual conscience. The place where Hegel focused on ‘conscience’ in ‘Philosophy of Right’ is the last part of ‘morality’ called ‘good and conscience’. The conscience discussed in ‘morality’ is ‘formal conscience’, and it is only in ‘ethics(Sittlichkeit)’ that ‘true conscience’ appears as the ‘heart of ethics’. While ‘formal conscience’ is ‘the inner conviction of the subject’, ‘true conscience’ is ‘the heart that desires goodness in and for itself’. We can apply this distinction of conscience to the issues of ‘conscientious objection to military service’ and ‘alternative service.’ When an individual publicly asserts freedom of conscience as a fundamental right, the individual’s subjective conviction is expressed externally through this assertion and no longer remains as his or her own ideology. Conscientious objection to military service becomes a social issue only when this act of refusal is publicly expressed. According to Hegel, ‘expression of conscience’ is not unrelated to the process in which conscience progresses(bilden) from the ‘formal conscience’ of morality to the ‘true conscience’ of ethics. Like the alternative service system, ‘expression of individual demands for changes in the social system’ shows a situation in which ‘moral reflection based on individual conscience’ and ‘national system’ are inconsistent, and it becomes a task that the community must solve. In this respect, institutional change cannot be unrelated to the issue of individual conscience, and individual demands cannot help but affect national institution, either positively or negatively. The reason Hegel describes ethics as a ‘living good’ is because this good is not a mere subjective conviction but has ‘its own reality through acts of self-consciousness’. Therefore, we can confirm Hegel’s position that by establishing institutions and laws that fit the expression of individual demands, the state can not only expand individual freedom but also solidify the ethics of the state. Of course, Hegel knows well that institutional changes such as the establishment of an alternative service system are not easily achieved without any effort, so he uses the expression ‘tremendous leap’ and argues that the state becomes a ‘state worthy of being called a state’ as it accepts social demands through ‘cultivation(Bildung) of reason’. From this perspective, it can be justified that Hegel would not have opposed the state taking into consideration religious people who refuse military service to complete alternative service and embracing them as members of the state so that they can fulfill their duties and enjoy their rights within the state.