Chevron 원칙과 미국 통상법의 관계 : 연방대법원의 Chevron 폐지 판결이 통상(通商) 소송에 미치는 영향

Traditional theories of administrative law prioritized curbing the discretion of administrative agencies to preserve the separation of powers and protect the institutional authority of the legislative and judicial branches. In the United States, the Chevron doctrine, established by the Supreme Court’s 1984 decision in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. served for nearly four decades as a cornerstone of judicial deference to reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous statutory provisions of federal laws. Under Chevron, courts employed a two-step framework to determine whether an agency’s interpretation of a statute exceeded its authority. At Step One, courts assessed whether Congress had spoken directly and unambiguously to the issue in question. If congressional intent was clear, the statute was interpreted accordingly, and no deference was afforded to the agency. To ascertain legislative intent, courts examined the statutory text, legislative history, and broader statutory context. At Step Two, if the statute was found to be ambiguous, courts evaluated whether the agency’s interpretation was reasonable. If deemed reasonable, the agency’s interpretation would be upheld, even if the court might have reached a different conclusion.The Chevron doctrine facilitated efficient policymaking by empowering agencies to resolve statutory ambiguities, a feature that was often embraced by ruling administrations. However, it also faced criticism, primarily from opposition parties, as an unconstitutional delegation of legislative and judicial authority to the executive branch. These critics viewed Chevron as undermining the constitutional roles of Congress and the judiciary. While judicial reliance on Chevron began to wane in the 2000s, federal courts continued to apply the doctrine in significant cases. However, the Supreme Court, in its recent decisions, including Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo and Relentless Inc. v Department of Commerce has formally overruled Chevron with a conservative majority marking a significant shift in administrative law. In the context of trade litigation, Chevron deference frequently served as the basis for judicial restraint, particularly in challenges to decisions by the International Trade Commission and the Department of Commerce during trade remedy investigations. Courts routinely deferred to agency expertise in interpreting ambiguous trade statutes, provided the agencies’ decisions were deemed “reasonable.” While the abolition of Chevron is unlikely to result in an immediate surge in trade-related litigation, given the strict procedural timelines that govern trade remedy investigations, it is likely to shift the focus of future litigation. In particular, challenges that once centered on procedural issues may increasingly target substantive determinations, which were previously shielded by Chevron deference.