동맹의 공약 이행에 관한 국제법의 구속력 검토

The 2024 U.S. presidential election poses uncertainties for the ROK-US alliance, including the potential withdrawal of U.S. troops from ROK. How effectively can the official treaty, the ROK-US Mutual Defense Treaty, prevent abandonment by the US? To what extent can international law ensure the binding implementation of alliance commitments? To answer these questions, this study examines the alliance dilemma from an international law perspective. The alliance dilemma refers to a situation where a state seeks the support of its ally but is reluctant to provide reciprocal assistance. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, adopted in 1969, plays a role in guaranteeing commitments between states, yet it also provides grounds for justifying non-fulfillment of such commitments. Justifications for non-fulfillment include methods such as reservations and interpretative declarations, as well as utilizing casus foederis and obligation clauses. Furthermore, alliance treaties face clear limitations in terms of state responsibility, as it is difficult to seek reparations for non-compliance. Empirically, the abandonment of defense alliances has increased since the conclusion of the Vienna Convention. Therefore, international law cannot guarantee the fulfillment of alliance commitments, and political conditions emerge as a key variable.