사실적시 명예훼손죄의 폐지에 관한 검토

Defamation committed by stating true facts is being used as a means of strategic blockade by politicians and those in power. In addition, as seen in the MeToo movement, criminal punishment for stating true facts obscures issues that should be made public and turns victims who raise the issue into criminals. It is appropriate to protect ‘false reputation’ only in a civil manner, and cases where reputation is damaged by stating true facts should be excluded from criminal punishment. The degree of protection for victims in cases where reputation is damaged by stating true facts should be lower than in cases where reputation is damaged by stating false facts. Therefore, it cannot be said that there is no means of relief just because there is no punitive damages system in civil cases. Although Article 310 of the Criminal Act exists, it is difficult to say that the restriction of freedom of expression is minimized by this provision. Above all, even those who argue for the abolition of defamation by stating true facts seem unable to argue for complete abolition in order to punish the invasion of privacy under defamation clause. However, privacy and honor are different concepts, and the law deals with them differently. In civil law, they have been treated separately, and the legal principles of protection and limitation are different. The theory of defamation has been developed almost identically in civil and criminal law. It is inappropriate to include privacy in honor only in criminal punishment for defamation, just because there is a practical need.