스튜어드십 코드 도입을 통한 국민연금의 강화된 주주행동주의가 피투자기업의 이익조정에 미치는 영향

[Purpose]This study empirically examines the effects of the adoption of the Stewardship Code by the National Pension Service, focusing on earnings management by its investee companies. [Methodology]This study empirically verifies whether the differences in earnings management behaviors between the test sample, in which the National Pension Service has continuously invested more than 5% equity from 2016 to 2022, and the control group, where the National Pension Service did not invest during the same period, are more pronounced after the adoption of the Stewardship Code compared to the period before, using a Difference－in－Difference (DiD) analysis. [Findings]The analysis results show that the upward earnings management behavior of publicly listed companies, in which the National Pension Service holds more than 5% equity, tends to be significantly lower than that of the control group, and this phenomenon has become more pronounced after the adoption of the Stewardship Code. These results suggest that when the National Pension Service is a major shareholder, upward earnings management for managerial private benefits is effectively constrained, and such a controlling effect has been further expanded as the shareholder activism of the National Pension Service has been strengthened through the adoption of the Stewardship Code. [Implications]The results of this study provide policy implications that, to improve the weak corporate governance structure of Korean companies—which has been pointed out as one of the main factors of the “Korea Discount”—the shareholder activities of institutional investors need to be more actively conducted. To achieve this purpose, it may be necessary to establish institutional devices that encourage the adoption of the Stewardship Code and strengthen the system to ensure its implementation.