희망수량 경쟁입찰에서의 투찰 유인에 관한 연구: 공공조달 입찰 담합 사례를 중심으로

This study theoretically investigates the bidding incentives and outcomes in competitive bidding for desired quantity and examines the factors affecting the bidding incentives in collusion cases in public procurement auctions. We divide the bidding system into three types based on the method to determine the winning price. Under specific assumptions there is a difference in bidding incentives among the three types but the winning price is similar to the estimated price in all types. In particular, under the general type or the 'lowest price' type used in domestic public procurement auctions the but-for competitive bidding price is close to the estimated price. This result indicates that, under certain assumptions, the difference between the winning price in collusive bidding and the but-for competitive bidding price may be negligible. This suggests that when assessing the anti-competitive effects in collusion cases, it is necessary to consider the characteristics of the bidding process and the industry. We also discuss that even when the assumptions are not met, the method for calculating the estimated price and adjusting the contract price in public procurement auctions may affect the bidding strategies of bidders and potentially lead to higher bidding prices. These results have important implications for the operation of public procurement auctions, the evaluation of anti-competitive effects in collusion cases, and the damage estimation in damage lawsuits.