반응적 규제이론 관점에서 바라본 가산세 제도의 개선방안

This study aims to improve Korea’s penalty tax system by applying the responsive regulation theory introduced by John Braithwaite and Ian Ayres in 1992. To achieve this, the study reviews the key principles of responsive regulation theory and analyzes penalty tax systems related to reporting and payment in the United States, Japan, and Australia. Based on these insights, it suggests ways to enhance Korea’s penalty tax system from the perspective of responsive regulation theory. Traditionally, tax administration has focused on detecting and penalizing taxpayers who fail to comply with their tax obligations. However, this heavy-handed approach has faced limitations as economies become increasingly internationalized and complex. In response, the OECD proposed a co-operative compliance model based on responsive regulation theory, which seeks to encourage voluntary compliance by fostering trust and cooperation between regulators and taxpayers. Penalty taxes are administrative sanctions imposed for violations of tax law obligations, primarily serving a punitive function. However, it is important to recognize that penalty tax systems should also promote sincere compliance among taxpayers. In the current tax environment, penalty taxes should function not merely as a punitive measure but also as a preventive tool that encourages compliance and deters non-compliance. To achieve this, the principles of responsive regulation theory should be incorporated into the design of the penalty tax system. With this understanding, the study proposes the following improvements. First, to encourage voluntary corrections, it is suggested to amend the current regulations that reduce penalties for underreporting, excessive refund claims, and failure to file. The amendment should expand the scope of reductions to include amended returns submitted before a tax audit or correction by the tax authorities. Second, the study suggests adopting a differential penalty tax system based on taxpayer behavior, where penalties for first-time non-compliance are reduced, while stricter penalties are imposed for repeated violations. Lastly, it proposes dividing late payment penalties into two categories：one as a sanction for non-compliance with tax obligations and the other as compensation for financial costs incurred due to delayed payment.