소액주주 의결권이 내·외부감시기구의 활동성에 미치는 영향

The purpose of this study is to analyze whether the minority shareholder voting protection and the minority shareholder stake ratio each increase the activity of internal and external monitoring bodies, and then to analyze whether the voting protection and the minority shareholder stake ratio interact. This study limited internal and external monitoring activities as the frequency of communication between external auditors and the governance body and the number of board meetings, and used multiple regression to verify the influence of minority shareholder voting rights. The study showed that the cumulative voting and the minority shareholder stake increase the activities of internal and external monitoring bodies. These results indicate that the cumulative voting system and the minority shareholder stake can be pressures to increase management monitoring activities. However, there was no significant interaction between the minority shareholders’ voting protection and their stakes on the activities of internal and external monitoring bodies. These results suggest that the effects of the minority shareholders’ voting protection and their stakes on management monitoring activities are independent of each other. This study provides new evidence that minority shareholder voting rights can exert pressure on the governance body to monitor management. Therefore, it suggests that incentives are needed to expand the application of the minority shareholders’ voting rights protection while reducing their side effects.