12·3 비상계엄사태와 한국형 민주공화제의 진화

This article aims to examine the Declaration of Martial Law(DML) on 3 December 2024 from the perspective of the evolution of the Korean democratic republic. I define the nature of the constitutional system embodied in the current Constitution of 1987 as a ‘Korean-style democratic republic’, and identify the characteristics of this ideological type in three points. First, it develops a presidential system that presupposes cooperation with the parliament at the level of the political power structure. Second, a constitutional court system with a wide range of constitutional jurisdiction is envisaged to play the role of constitutional coordinator in constitutional disputes such as impeachment. Third, it also features the vitalization of what might be called ‘plaza democracy’ symbolizing people’s direct action at the level of political culture. These institutional and cultural features of the Korean democratic republic had ambivalent positive and negative effects during the DML. As a result of this analysis, DML has once again confirmed the need for the Korean democratic republic to reform its limiting factors while faithfully inheriting its positive dimensions. President Yoon Seok Yeol, who led DML, should be removed from office because, according to the established jurisprudence of the impeachment adjudication process, his violation of the constitution and laws in the performance of his duties was clearly confirmed and the gravity of the violation was sufficiently recognized to pose a grave threat to the free and democratic basic order and to reveal his lack of commitment to the defense of the constitution and his betrayal of the people’s trust. The specific goal of this article is to examine the root and structural causes of DML, the third impeachment proceeding against the President in the history of the Constitution, from the perspective of the evolution of the Korean democratic republic, and to explore ways of institutional reform and cultural innovation to respond to them. In the final section, this article also attempts to capture and forecast the trends of social change identified in the wake of the martial law from the perspective of democratic republics. Based on the results of the review, it is argued that the Korean-style democratic republic is hindered by the ‘paradox of democratization’ in the sense that the privatization of public power under the aegis of the prosecutor’s office and other powerful law enforcement institutions, the intensification of the politicization and commercialization of the mass media, and the monopolization of the political process by the vested social and economic interests are the root causes of the DML as a self-coup. In addition, it is pointed out that the lower political system, such as the electoral system and the political party system, structured delays in institutional reform that perpetuated the ‘democratic deficit’, while the political culture failed to overcome the authoritarian culture before democratization, which contributed to the deepening of political polarization. In the end, it comes to the conclusion that it is necessary to promote the reform of the political system in terms of constitutional amendments and legislative reforms so that the characteristics of a democratic republic in the constitutional power structure can be further realized by making continuous reform of law-enforcement institutions and electoral reform a top priority, and to develop a second democratization movement that innovates political culture through the strengthening of civic education.