목적론적 해석의 이론사 - 19세기 이후 독일의 논의를 중심으로

Teleological interpretation or purposive interpretation does not refer to arbitrarily extending or reducing the meaning of law with the aim of obtaining the personally preferred results of the interpreter. It rather refers to a method of interpretation and a means of argument, which discusses the legitimacy of the interpreted rules of law by seriously exploring the purpose of law, predicting the results that may occur in case of the application of the rules of law drawn from the interpretation, and evaluating such results in light of the purpose they aim to achieve. In order to understand teleological interpretation in abundance, this paper attempts a historical research of teleological interpretation, focusing on discussions in Germany. To begin with, examining the discussions on the purpose of law raised by Savigny, Jhering, and Radbruch confirms that the purpose of law explored through teleological interpretation is not a single notion, but a multifaceted one that seeks to ‘guarantee social living conditions’ in terms of interest and constitutes die Rechtsidee in terms of value. Furthermore, the purpose of law can be confirmed as a multi-layered notion which combines various purposes ranging from the abstract to the concrete, including the general purpose of law, the purpose which the constitution established by the community of the state aims to achieve, the purpose pursued in each legal domain such as civil law, criminal law, and public law, the purpose of specific laws, the purpose of relevant legal provisions, and the purpose revealed from actual litigations. This paper will then examine the development of the German legal methodology to have a diachronic view of teleological interpretation as a method or criterion for legal interpretation. Mainly reviewing the theories of Engisch and Larenz, we can see how subjective interpretation theory and objective interpretation theory on legal interpretation structured the concept of teleological interpretation from their own perspectives. Finally, Alexy establishes canons of interpretation as an argument-form that can be used in legal argumentation. Alexy also explains that the superiority and inferiority of canons of interpretation cannot be determined by fixed rules and depends on pragmatic rules that change depending on the situation and context. Through this review, issues of legal interpretation, including the temporal point of legal interpretation, the relation between legal interpretation and development of law, the relation between the legislature and the judiciary, and the question of the hierarchy of legal interpretation methods, will be presented clearly.