SUPREMACY OF CONSCIENCE IN BUTLER’S MORAL PHILOSOPHY : A DEFENSE AND A CRITIQUE

Butler’s moral philosophy is perhaps best known for its detailed depiction of the faculty of conscience. Conscience, he argues, is the supreme moral principle in humans and should be heeded at all times. There have been criticisms of his doctrine with one challenging his naturalness thesis, contending that the naturalness of virtue renders the supremacy of conscience ineffective. Another criticism suggests that his account of moral philosophy loses much of its significance when separated from the theological background. Here in this work, I argue that these criticisms are unwarranted. Additionally, I explore what Butler means by the supremacy of conscience and elucidate his main arguments for this supremacy and for the need to heed its judgements. While outlining the main arguments of Butler’s doctrine of the supremacy of conscience I introduce a critique of my own, namely, that the part which Butler calls ‘self-condemnation’ should have been more prominently incorporated into his thesis. I propose that defending the natural supremacy of conscience with reference to real life examples of self- condemnation would make his portrayal of conscience more viable and convincing.