행정기관의 독립성과 민주성 — 독립규제기관의 도입논의에 관한 소고 —

As a result of the National Assembly, a majority-elected institution, and the president gradually increasing the intensity of their control over the administration, the politicization of the administration has accelerated, which has enhanced the administration's democratic nature in terms of the so-called “democratic legitimacy loop,” while weakening the administration's independence and professionalism in proportion to this. In this context, discussions are ongoing to delegate policy-making authority to institutions that are not directly accountable to elected representatives, with the aim of overcoming the limitations of majority democracy or electoral democracy. A typical example is the discussion of the introduction of an independent regulatory agency to keep a certain distance from politics and to perform administrative duties independently. This fact can also be confirmed in the current government's national agenda. In order to strengthen the independence and professionalism of the administration, an organization modeled on the US-style independent regulatory commission system was introduced, and the need to depoliticize regulations in some areas, such as the determination of electricity prices, has also been raised. However, policy-making is a ‘political decision’ and must be. In other words, administrative agencies that are directly or indirectly recognized as having democratic legitimacy must exercise their authority and bear proportional responsibility. The problem caused by the overabundance of politics due to electoral democracy within the administration should be solved not by excluding politics, but by “restoring politics,” that is, restoring the administration's own democracy. If the main reason why the administration has been unable to function properly is that politics has become overly involved and interfered with the administration due to the excesses of electoral democracy, the solution should naturally begin with respect for traditional administrative institutions and a proper distance from electoral democracy. Rather, if traditional administrative agencies are left as they are, being politicized, and new, depoliticized independent agencies are established to exercise important policy-making powers, there is a risk of the creation of unconstitutional organizations that have only authority but no democratic accountability. Even in the United States and Germany, discussions are being held in the direction of strengthening the democratic accountability of administrative organizations. The purpose of reforming the administrative organization should not be to depoliticize it. Sound policy-making requires that the executive branch be granted a certain degree of legal discretion and judgment, and that its democratic accountability be subsequently questioned. If so, an independent regulatory agency that fundamentally excludes the political responsibility of the president, the head of the executive branch and the final authority, is difficult to be permitted under the current constitutional order.