경영자 능력이 초과현금과 감사노력 사이의 관계에 미치는 영향：기업지배구조 감시 수준의 조절효과

[Purpose] This study classifies corporate governance structure into internal monitoring mechanisms implemented by the board of directors and the headquarters of large business groups, and external monitoring mechanisms exerted by substantial foreign and institutional investors. The study empirically investigates whether the extent to which managerial ability attenuates the heightened audit effort associated with excess cash holdings varies depending on the strength of these two types of governance mechanisms. [Methodology] We estimate the cash holdings model developed by Opler et al.(1999) using an estimation sample comprising 2,133 firm－year observations over the period 2000 ～2004. The estimated model is then applied to a holdout sample of 4,689 firm－year observations spanning 2005∼2014 to compute the predicted cash holdings ratio. Excess cash holdings are calculated as the difference between the actual and predicted cash holdings ratios. To empirically test the hypotheses, we perform multiple regression analyses. [Findings] The empirical findings suggest that greater managerial ability mitigates the incremental audit effort necessitated by excess cash holdings. This attenuating effect is significantly stronger in firms characterized by a higher proportion of outside directors and affiliation with large business groups, indicating the reinforcing role of internal governance structures. Moreover, the presence of substantial foreign and institutional investors further amplifies the moderating role of managerial ability, highlighting the complementary influence of external monitoring mechanisms. [Policy Implications] These test results provide empirical evidence that when corporate governance monitoring is effective, managerial ability can mitigate the increase in audit fees caused by excess cash holdings. These findings can serve as a basis for designing policies and control systems related to excess cash holdings. Additionally, the study offers insights that managerial ability and corporate governance should be considered in decision－making processes related to audit effort expended by external auditors.