감사보수의 라운딩 현상에 대한 실증분석

This study conducts an empirical analysis into the phenomenon of ‘rounding’ in audit fees within audit contracts for publicly listed firms in Korea. We investigate the prevalence of audit fees being quoted in round numbers instead of precise figures, examining the underlying determinants of this behavior and its economic implications. Drawing upon a dataset of audit fee information spanning the period from 2019 to 2023, our initial analysis confirms that audit fees are indeed disproportionately clustered around specific, salient round numbers, such as increments of KRW 100 million or KRW 50 million. This clustering suggests that the use of round numbers in audit fee contracts is not merely a habitual or arbitrary practice but potentially reflects deliberate auditor strategies or serves as signals regarding the quality of the audit being offered. Our detailed empirical analyses reveal several key findings. Approximately 62% of the audit fees in our comprehensive sample were quoted using round-number values, highlighting the widespread nature of this practice. We find that the likelihood of an audit fee being presented as a precise amount—rather than a rounded one—is significantly higher when the engagement is performed by a Big 4 accounting firm. This suggests that larger, high-quality audit firms may use precise fee quotes as a way to signal their professionalism and the rigor of their services. Furthermore, client firms with higher profitability are also more likely to receive precise audit fee quotations, indicating that the strategic importance of the client to the auditor may influence the precision of the fee proposal. Consistent with the idea that precision carries economic meaning, we observe that audit fees expressed as round numbers tend to be associated with both lower total audit fees and shorter audit hours utilized for the engagement, compared to engagements where fees are quoted with more precise values. These associations suggest that the numerical precision (or lack thereof) in audit fee quotations may capture important aspects of the auditor’s negotiation stance, their expected effort level, and the overall characteristics of the audit engagement. This study makes a significant contribution to the audit literature by identifying and empirically analyzing the numerical presentation format of the audit fee itself as an informative signal of auditor behavior and the dynamics of audit contracting. It moves beyond simply analyzing the level of audit fees to consider how the fees are quoted. The findings offer valuable practical implications for various stakeholders, including audit committees responsible for engaging auditors and investors who utilize publicly available information. These parties may be able to infer aspects of the auditor’s perceived diligence, negotiation strength, and the expected quality of the audit engagement based on the degree of numerical precision with which the audit fees are expressed. By introducing numerical precision as a meaningful dimension of audit fee disclosure and analysis, this study provides novel insights from both empirical and interpretive perspectives, suggesting that even seemingly minor details in financial reporting can carry significant economic information.