실질적 피압수자 법리가 초래하는 모순과 이를 해결할 법리의 제시

Korean courts have consistently denied the admissibility of digital evidence obtained by investigative agencies without guaranteeing the right to participate in search and seizure processes. This stance reflects an effort to curb indiscriminate exploration of information storage media, leading to an expansion of the scope of individuals granted participation rights. However, when establishing criteria for recognizing a person as a "seized party"  with participation rights, courts have focused on the ownership of the information storage medium itself rather than on the right to manage and dispose of the electronic information contained within it. Furthermore, the courts have cited Article 121 of the Criminal Procedure Act as the basis for the seized party's right to participate, contradicting previous precedents that interpreted this article as safeguarding the "suspect's" right to participate. This paper will point out the inconsistencies in the "de facto seized party" concept established by case law. It will then argue for a clear distinction between "suspects" and "seized parties," asserting that the seized party's right to participate originates not from Article 121 but from provisions such as Article 118 of the Criminal Procedure Act. Additionally, it will be contended that while information storage media, as physical objects, are subject to seizure, the electronic information contained within them, when subject to exploration, falls under the purview of search. Therefore, efforts should be made to identify the "searched party" rather than the "seized party" by applying Article 109. This legal framework aims to prevent indiscriminate exploration of electronic information sets containing vast amounts of mixed data while simultaneously ensuring the participation rights of those who have de facto control and disposition over the electronic information sets