운에 의한 성과와 경영자 보상

This study examines the impact of uncontrollable luck factors on executive compensation. Executive compensation is closely tied to firm performance, which is influenced not only by managerial ability but also by uncontrollable luck factors such as market fluctuations and industry trends. To capture the effects of luck and skill factors more precisely, this study separates firm performance into luck-based and skill-based components and analyzes their respective relationships with changes in executive compensation. Using data on CEO compensation disclosures from 2013 to 2022 for publicly listed firms, we find a significant positive relationship between performance attributed to luck and executive compensation. In other words, executive pay increases not only due to skill factors like managerial ability but also in response to firm performance i mprovements driven by external market and industry influences. Furthermore, this relationship holds symmetrically, meaning that compensation decreases when luck factors negatively affect firm performance, rather than being asymmetrically protected against downturns. This effect is especially pronounced for professional CEOs compared to owner CEOs, suggesting differences in governance structures and monitoring. Various robustness checks, including alternative performance specifications and empirical approaches, confirm the validity and consistency of the results. These findings provide practical implications for designing transparent and fair executive compensation systems, ensuring that pay structures align with both performance and corporate governance objectives.