사외이사의 감독 효과와 실제이익조정: 중국 신증권법 시행 전후의 분석

This study analyzes whether the implementation of the new Securities Law contributed to reducing real earnings management by strengthening board independence and enhancing its supervisory role, based on data from firms listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2014 to 2023. The study examines the impact of board independence on real earnings management and conducts a group-wise regression analysis by dividing the sample into two periods: before (2014-2019) and after (2020-2023) the implementation of the new Securities Law, comparing the differences in board independence’s influence on real earnings management between these periods. The results show that, first, firms with higher board independence exhibit lower levels of real earnings management across the entire sample. Second, before the implementation of the new Securities Law, the effect of independent directors in restraining real earnings management was not statistically significant; however, after the implementation, this restraining effect was found to have strengthened. These findings suggest that the new Securities Law enhanced the supervisory effectiveness of independent directors by strengthening disclosure requirements and increasing the costs of violations, thereby potentially reducing firms’ incentives and opportunities for real earnings management. This study analyzes the impact of board independence on earnings management in the context of the new Securities Law reform. From the perspective of institutional changes, this study examines the impact of strengthened legal regulations on corporate governance. The findings provide empirical evidence for policymakers, supporting further improvements to the independent director system and enhancing capital market transparency. The findings of this study will serve as a valuable reference for regulatory agencies and foreign investors.