대주주의 주식담보대출이 회계정보의 질에 미치는 영향 : 재무제표 비교가능성을 중심으로

[Purpose] This study investigates the impact of controlling shareholders' stock pledge on the qualitative level of accounting information. Specifically, it analyzes how management decisions, made to counteract the stock price decline due to controlling shareholders' stock pledge, affect the comparability of financial statements, and examines the relationship between stock pledge and financial statement comparability. [Methodology] Comparability is meausred following De Franco et al.(2011). For firms listed on the KOSPI and KOSDAQ from 2009 to 2022, a regression analysis is conducted using the presence of stock collateral loans by major shareholders and the total stock collateral loan ratio as independent variables. [Findings] The findings reveal that firms with higher ratios of controlling shareholders' stock pledge have deteriorated comparability of financial statements. This negative correlation between controlling shareholders' stock pledge and financial statement comparability is mitigated in firms with a higher foreign investor ownership. These findings hold even after controlling for endogeneity related to the characteristics of firms with stock pledge. [Implications] This indicates that management decisions made by companies with controlling shareholders' stock pledge in response to negative market reactions tend to decrease the qualitative level of accounting information, and this effect is alleviated with higher levels of external monitoring. his study enhances understanding of managerial behavior in firms with stock pledges and the quality of their accounting information. It also highlights how external monitoring can mitigate the decline in accounting quality caused by controlling shareholders' private borrowing, emphasizing the importance of external monitoring in improving capital market efficiency and transparency.