대통령의 법률안 거부권에 관한 비교법적 연구

The principle of separation of powers is not merely about dividing state authority; it plays a crucial role in preventing the concentration and abuse of power through mutual checks and balances among the branches of government, ultimately safeguarding the fundamental rights of citizens. In this context, the presidential veto is an institutional mechanism designed to allow the executive branch to directly intervene in the legislative process by influencing bills adopted by the legislature. This system serves as an important means of maintaining balance between the legislative and executive branches, preventing the abuse of power, and realizing constitutional values and the public interest. However, the current presidential veto system in South Korea has structural limitations, including the risk of abuse stemming from the president’s discretionary judgment, stringent requirements for legislative override, and the absence of judicial control. With the recent increase in presidential vetoes and the use of abstract criteria such as political neutrality as justification, inter-party conflict has intensified and public trust has declined. Thus, institutional reform is urgently required. Accordingly, the grounds exercising for a presidential veto should be clearly stipulated in the Constitution, and the president should be required to provide written reasons for exercising the veto to limit arbitrary decision-making and enhance accountability to both the National Assembly and the public. In addition, judicial control mechanisms should be established to introduce procedures for judicial review of presidential vetoes. Furthermore, the current constitutional requirements for legislative override should be relaxed to restore the balance of power between the legislature and the executive. Introducing of a partial veto mechanism could also improve the flexibility and efficiency of the legislative process. From a political perspective, it is necessary to strengthen institutional mechanisms for inter-party negotiation and to formally incorporate the executive branch’s views from the early stages of the legislative process. In the long term, adopting a mixed system of government could provide an institutional foundation for checks and balances, responsible governance, and collaborative administration between the executive and legislative branches.