예금의 형법적 성격에 관한 정합적 해석론

In modern society, bank deposits functionally operate in the same manner as cash, serving as a central medium of exchange in economic life. Due to this functional similarity, there has been a persistent view that deposits should be regarded as “property” under criminal law, akin to cash. While the Supreme Court has explicitly stated that deposits are “property interests,” it has also inconsistently treated them as “property” in certain precedents, such as those involving embezzlement, creating interpretive ambiguity. This study argues that, in accordance with civil law principles, deposits—being contractual claims arising from a consumption deposit agreement—should not be classified as “property” under criminal law. First, the argument that depositors exert exclusive control over deposits misunderstands the nature of deposit contracts, which are revocable at any time. Second, concerns over enforcement gaps are unfounded, as property interest crimes and statutes such as the Act on the Regulation and Punishment of Concealment of Crime Proceeds can adequately address deposit-related offenses. Third, the idea that different forms of money storage should change the applicable criminal provisions lacks legal coherence. Thus, deposits are property interests, not property. On this basis, the current jurisprudence should be revised. For example, withdrawing cash using a stolen credit card should be punished as a computer fraud offense. In voice phishing cases, deposits should not be considered stolen property. In cases where entrusted money has been deposited into a bank, the crime should be breach of trust, not embezzlement.