이집트의 세이프가드 조치와 법적 단절:철강 산업에 관한 사례 연구

This article explains why Egypt’s safeguard measures have been reactive and short-lived despite a facially complete domestic framework. The core claim is that outcomes are driven less by a lack of authority than by (i) textual and procedural misalignments between Law No. 161 of 1998 (and its Executive Regulations) and the WTO Agreement on Safeguards, and (ii) overlapping review by the State Council and the Economic Courts that enables parallel challenges, interim stays, and inconsistent appellate paths. The analysis is grounded in two complementary theories. Domestic Implementation Theory is used to assess how international obligations are internalized across legislation, administration, and courts; Legal Fragmentation Theory illuminates how proliferating mandates and procedures generate uncertainty and forum selection. Together they frame why drafting gaps and multi-forum oversight depress predictability even when formal authority exists. Methodologically, the paper integrates: (1) clause-by-clause doctrinal comparison of Law 161/1998 with the SGA (e.g., SGA Article 6’s “critical circumstances” vs. a prima facie domestic threshold; non-attribution and “unforeseen developments”; transparency and progressive liberalization); (2) process-tracing Egypt’s safeguard practice (1995–2025) via WTO notifications and outcomes; and (3) institutional mapping of adjudicatory pathways across the State Council, Economic Courts, and the Supreme Constitutional Court. As a sectoral case study, steel provides the clearest window into these dynamics (2012, 2015–2017, 2019–2022, and the 2025 HRC investigation): repeated provisional actions, early terminations, and limited definitive measures coincide with jurisdictional overlap and review sequences that interrupt fact-finding and remedy phasing. Findings are threefold. First, drafting gaps (for example, initiation thresholds) and exposure to premature judicial interruption explain cycles of short-term protection and re-filings. Second, the dual-track judiciary—with different appellate endpoints—systematically lengthens timelines and increases the risk of contradictory rulings relative to the SGA’s expectation of uninterrupted investigation and post-determination review. Third, Egypt’s safeguard practice remains primarily domestically oriented, with limited engagement in consultations/compensation under the SGA. The contribution is twofold: it specifies where domestic texts conform to—and diverge from—WTO requirements, and it shows how Egypt’s judicial architecture interacts with those divergences to produce volatility. The paper closes with targeted reforms to tighten drafting and rationalize review pathways, while acknowledging political-economic constraints that shape enforcement choices.