중국 신「광물자원법」 시행에 따른 전략 광물 공급망 리스크와 국제통상법적 함의

This paper analyzes the strategic mineral supply chain risks arising from the implementation of China's newly revised Mineral Resources Law and explores the implications from an international trade law perspective. The background of this study is the intensified US-China strategic competition, which has led China to implement its new mineral resources law in July 2025, emphasizing the security of key minerals. Fully revised for the first time since its initial enactment in 1986, the law focuses explicitly on ensuring national mineral resource security, establishes a unified management system by classifying minerals of economic and national security importance into a designated strategic minerals list, and mandates the establishment of emergency response and national stockpiling mechanisms. This legal amendment is widely perceived as part of China's strategic effort to leverage its dominance in critical minerals, such as rare earths, amidst ongoing US-China trade tensions. China’s resource control policies significantly amplify global supply chain risks. Strategic minerals, including rare earths, lithium, cobalt, and graphite, are essential to advanced industries and energy transition sectors, yet their supply chains remain highly concentrated geographically. China, in particular, maintains a near-monopoly position over global rare earth supplies, and any restrictions on exports could severely disrupt global manufacturing. Indeed, China previously weaponized resource exports by halting rare earth exports to Japan in 2010 during the Senkaku Islands dispute. Similarly, in 2018 during heightened US-China trade conflicts, China delayed export licenses for rare earths, severely impacting automotive and defense industries in the US and EU. Such export restrictions led to international disputes, culminating in WTO rulings that China’s export quotas and tariffs on rare earths violated WTO agreements. WTO dispute panels have explicitly indicated that China's export restrictions, justified as measures for resource conservation, constituted unjustified support for domestic industries and could not be validated under existing trade norms. In response, the Chinese government expressed regret over the WTO ruling, arguing that "the WTO should respect member countries' sovereignty over natural resources and permit necessary policies." This highlights the inherent tension between resource security measures and international trade regulations. This paper closely examines the possibility of conflicts between China's new Mineral Resources Law and WTO regulations, particularly focusing on Article XI (General Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions) and Article XXI (Security Exceptions) of the GATT 1994, through relevant case analyses. The paper further explores policy alternatives for stabilizing strategic mineral supply chains and recommends appropriate legal responses for Korea. At the international level, it underscores the necessity of strengthening WTO frameworks or establishing international mineral security agreements to prevent excessive export controls. Furthermore, Korea must proactively diversify its import sources, expand stockpiles, and rapidly reform domestic laws and institutions to prepare for the era of resource weaponization. The Korean government’s "Critical Mineral Security Strategy" announced in 2023 aims to reduce dependency on China for lithium, cobalt, graphite, and other critical minerals from approximately 80% to around 50% by 2030, along with establishing new mineral stockpiling facilities. Based on this comprehensive analysis, the paper derives important legal and policy implications for effective strategic mineral supply chain crisis management and proposes pathways to harmonize resource security with the international trading order.