중국 형법상 국가안전위해범죄 규제에 관한 연구

This study systematically examines the regulatory framework for “crimes endangering national security” set out in Chapter I of Part Two of the Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China (Articles 102–113), identifies operational features and issues through analysis of relevant Chinese case law, and derives implications for improving the statutory penalty structure for the crime of insurrection under the Korean Criminal Act. To this end, the study analyzes the pertinent provisions and publicly released cases made available by the Chinese government. The analysis finds that, with respect to conduct endangering national security, China adopts a flexible, graduated structure centered on the degree of participation, the riskiness of the conduct, and the gravity of the result, thereby implementing—at least in part—the principles of culpability and proportionality. At the same time, Article 106 (punishing collusion with foreign entities) appears potentially overbroad when assessed in terms of balance and necessity relative to other offenses in the same chapter, while Article 113 (application of the death penalty and confiscation of property to crimes endangering national security) risks heightening arbitrariness in the application of penalties by separately prescribing the maximum punishment. The review of case law revealed a greater-than-expected number of cases; on this basis, the study confirms that, in national-security offenses, the intrinsic secrecy of the information obtained and its nexus to national security—rather than the simplicity of the acquisition method—function as the core criteria for offense establishment and sentencing, and that punishment increases in a graduated manner according to the actor’s conduct. By contrast, under the Korean Criminal Act the statutory penalties for insurrection are extreme and rigid, prescribing death, life imprisonment, or life imprisonment without labor for ringleaders, and imposing relatively severe punishment even on those who merely complied with superior orders or participated only minimally—limitations that fail to reflect offense gravity and degree of participation. Drawing on China’s tiered and progressive framework for crimes endangering national security, this study argues that Korea should more rationally segment the statutory penalty spectrum for insurrection. Such reform is expected to strengthen the rationality of criminal policy and the legitimacy of penal power in relation to national-security offenses. The study also aims to enhance understanding of Chinese criminal law and policy while serving as practical and concrete groundwork for revising Korea’s statutory penalties for insurrection.