독일과 미국에서의 정당재정에 대한 국가적 지원제도의 내용과 시사점 - 독일과 미국의 정당에 대한 국고보조제도를 중심으로 -

The existing preliminary studies have shown that the subsidy system for political parties in South Korea has undergone critical examination regarding distribution criteria and the use of subsidies. Therefore, this article intends to omit an introduction to this criticism. The goal is to derive constitutional limits for the financial support of parties from the origins of political funding support systems in Germany and the USA. The funding system for parties in the USA is not party-centered but candidate-centered, and the proportion of state funding for the operation of parties and campaign expenses is not high compared to Germany. Furthermore, the American system of financial support for parties is inadequate in terms of general, comprehensive, or partial financial support for operating costs and campaign funds compared to Germany and South Korea when viewed as a public system where the state bears the responsibility for funding procurement. However, it should be noted that in the USA, the private sector—meaning the long history of the two-party system—provides parties with greater opportunities for financial structuring, and it is not necessary for the share of state subsidies for campaigns and party operations to be large. Therefore, it is difficult to draw direct implications regarding constitutional limits on state subsidies for parties from the American system. Nevertheless, the fact that state subsidies for parties tend to increase indicates that the financial support provided by the state, formed through the tax burden of citizens, ultimately remains a burden for both the state and the citizens. Considering this, it can be said that the institutional characteristics of the American system, which presupposes parties’ responsibility for funding procurement and restricts the expenditure structure for campaign costs or provides limited financial support such as state subsidies for parties, possess a certain validity regarding the fairness of elections and the limitation of state subsidies for parties. Germany has a financial support system for parties that is very similar to ours. However, there are differences in the distribution criteria for state subsidies and in the absolute and relative caps. In fact, due to these differences, comparisons between the existing system of state subsidies for parties and the German system are often made. Such comparisons frequently present the introduction of absolute and relative caps as a proposal for institutional improvements. However, there is insufficient discussion regarding the constitutional standards for increasing these absolute caps when introducing them. This can be seen as a significant issue, as an absolute cap, if introduced like in Germany, will inevitably rise each year due to the inflation-linked structure. Due to these structural characteristics, the introduction of a relative cap is a prerequisite for the introduction of an absolute cap, and to create a certain constitutional control framework for the increase of the absolute cap, standards must be presented that constitutionally allow for the increase. In this context, the decision of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany in 2023, which states that even if it concerns financial needs of parties arising from an evident change in circumstances necessary for ensuring the constitutional tasks of parties and the sustainability of the party system, the absolute cap can be increased, is highly relevant in clarifying the introduction of absolute and relative caps and the associated constitutional limits of financial support for parties.