질병 등의 보험사고가 대출 연체율에 미치는 영향 - 신용보험 활성화에의 시사점 -

This study analyzes the impact of insurance events—such as the onset of serious illness or injury—on loan delinquency rates and seeks to derive implications for promoting credit insurance, which provides coverage for default risk stemming from such events. Utilizing diagnostic and insurance claim data aggregated by the Korea Credit Information Services (CreDB), a multivariate logistic regression model was applied with loan delinquency as the dependent variable. The results indicate that for borrowers with insurance coverage, the occurrence of insured events such as illness or injury is associated with a decrease in delinquency rates. However, among economically vulnerable subgroups, even insured borrowers exhibited a higher likelihood of delinquency following an insured event. This suggests that the protective function of insurance may be insufficient due to variations in coverage scope and benefit levels. For borrowers who are already covered by public health insurance, the reduced delinquency risk associated with credit insurance may justify lower insurance premiums or loan interest rates. In contrast, uninsured borrowers and those with lower economic capacity may have a stronger incentive to purchase credit insurance. Moreover, the finding that unemployment due to economic downturns increases loan delinquency risk highlights the potential for expanding the coverage scope of credit insurance to include such events. International cases—such as those in the United States, the United Kingdom, and France—have shown that while the expansion of credit insurance can bring financial protection, it has also raised concerns about consumer harm. Therefore, proactive regulatory design by supervisory authorities is essential. Future research should also focus on empirical analyses and the development of evaluation models related to credit insurance pricing and loan interest rate structures, which form the basis for institutional policy design.