침익적 행정행위의 근거법령에 대한 엄격해석원칙 - 대법원 판례의 비판적 검토

As the number of Supreme Court rulings invoking the rule of strict interpretation of statutory bases for invasive administrative actions has risne, a comprehensive analysis and critical evaluation of this rule is now imperative. The rule appears to derive from the strict interpretation doctrine traditionally emphasized in the doctrines of nulla poena sine lege in criminal law and the principle of legality in tax law. In the context of invasive administrative measures, it functions to restrict interpretations that exceed the possible meaning of the statutory text. A close examination of relevant case law shows that, in general, the Courts’ conclusions are acceptable, and the Court’s various efforts to derive reasonable interpretations of the law are evident. However, certain cases reveal shortcomings in logical consistency when applying the strict interpretation rule or the rigor of its supporting arguments. In some instances, conclusions were reached through result-oriented or purposive interpretations that extend beyond the permissible plain meaning of the legislative text. Furthermore, the distinct characteristics of administrative law particularly compared to the principles of legality in criminal and tax law as well as the unique nature of administrative litigation are not sufficiently reflected in the Court’s reasoning and application of the strict interpretation rule. Given the unilateral authority inherent in administrative power, the rule of strict interpretation does hold practical value in administrative law. It reinforces the legitimacy of relying on the literal meaning of the text, enhances the persuasiveness and acceptability of judgments, and guards against potential arbitrary rulings through expansive purposive interpretation. It also serves to curb arbitrariness of administration and prevent vague drafting from hasty administrative legislation, thereby contributing to the rule of law in administrative governance. Nonetheless, in cases where achieving public interest is essential, and where the strict interpretation rule could risk becoming a means to circumvent legal obligations or evade responsibility, interpretation that exceeds the literal meaning of the text might be unavoidable. In such cases, courts should explicitly and candidly acknowledge the necessity of interpretation beyond the text and adopt purposive expansion or analogy as a deliberate methodological choice. Even then, such exceptions must be strictly limited to situations where they do not infringe upon the principle of legality in public law and must not apply in cases involving punitive or irreversible measures, such as administrative sanctions or enforcement actions. Finally, there is a pressing need to refine and organize the interpretive canons applicable in each context. Above all, what is crucial is the court’s efforts for persuasiveness of judicial reasoning. Courts must diligently articulate the grounds for selecting particular interpretive methods, for determining the range of plausible textual meanings, and for resorting to purposive interpretation where necessary and justified.