종업원의 지분소유와 노동투자효율성
Employee Stock Ownership and Labor Investment Efficiency
신혜정(부산대학교); 김수인(홍익대학교)
6권 2호, 49~76쪽
초록
This study examines the impact of employee ownership on labor investment efficiency, exploring whether employee ownership addresses the agency problem between managers and shareholders and employees’ retention motivation. We conjecture that employee ownership can effectively monitor management, leading to an increase in labor investment efficiency. Additionally, employee ownership increases the trust between employees and managers and lower the adjustment cost, which enhances labor investment efficiency. Using a sample of listed firms from 2012 to 2022, the results show a positive relationship between employee ownership and labor investment efficiency. The results are observed only for overinvestment, while no significant effect is found for underinvestment. Additional tests based on human capital intensity show labor investment efficiency improves only in firms with high intensity but no significant effect found in firms with low intensity. These findings suggest that employee ownership enhances labor investment efficiency by reducing the overinvestment in labor, suggesting the role of employee shareholders as an effective governance mechanism. The study provides empirical evidence supporting the positive role of employee shareholders. In particular, the findings regarding the influence of employee ownership on firm operations explain the positive views about employees share ownership in the capital market.
Abstract
This study examines the impact of employee ownership on labor investment efficiency, exploring whether employee ownership addresses the agency problem between managers and shareholders and employees’ retention motivation. We conjecture that employee ownership can effectively monitor management, leading to an increase in labor investment efficiency. Additionally, employee ownership increases the trust between employees and managers and lower the adjustment cost, which enhances labor investment efficiency. Using a sample of listed firms from 2012 to 2022, the results show a positive relationship between employee ownership and labor investment efficiency. The results are observed only for overinvestment, while no significant effect is found for underinvestment. Additional tests based on human capital intensity show labor investment efficiency improves only in firms with high intensity but no significant effect found in firms with low intensity. These findings suggest that employee ownership enhances labor investment efficiency by reducing the overinvestment in labor, suggesting the role of employee shareholders as an effective governance mechanism. The study provides empirical evidence supporting the positive role of employee shareholders. In particular, the findings regarding the influence of employee ownership on firm operations explain the positive views about employees share ownership in the capital market.
- 발행기관:
- 경영연구원
- 분류:
- 경영학일반