국무총리의 지위에 관한 헌법적 고찰- 개헌의 방향을 중심으로 -

This article aims to comprehensively examine the constitutional and institutional status of the Prime Minister under the Constitution of the Republic of Korea and to propose a reasonable direction for reforming the Prime Minister system in the course of constitutional amendment. The Prime Minister system was introduced as a product of political compromise between presidentialism and parliamentarism during the drafting of the First Constitution. Since then, it has remained a distinctive feature of the Korean constitutional history, combining the presidential framework with parliamentary elements. In practice, however, despite being endowed with roles such as assisting the President, serving as the second-in-command of the executive branch, vice-chairing the State Council, and functioning as a central administrative authority, the Prime Minister has largely remained subordinate to the President due to the structural dominance of presidential power. The authority to recommend the appointment and dismissal of cabinet members has become nominal, and the power to issue Prime Ministerial Orders or countersign presidential acts has proven insufficient to constrain presidential prerogatives. Furthermore, controversies concerning the scope of duties when acting as Acting President, the unconstitutionality of the “acting Prime Minister” practice, and the inconsistency between parliamentary confirmation and democratic legitimacy reveal fundamental contradictions of the current system. These limitations demonstrate that the Prime Minister has failed to operate as an effective institutional mechanism to disperse concentrated presidential authority. Against this backdrop, the study highlights the necessity of adopting a “responsible Prime Minister system,” drawing on comparative insights from France’s semi-presidentialism and Germany’s federal parliamentary model. Under such a system, the President would focus on foreign affairs, defense, and security, while the Prime Minister would exercise substantive authority over domestic policy and bear political accountability to the National Assembly. Additionally, the paper examines potential reforms such as introducing a fixed term for the Prime Minister, reconsidering the vice-presidential system, and restructuring the constitutional allocation of powers. Ultimately, the current Constitution does not sufficiently safeguard the status and authority of the Prime Minister. To overcome the excesses of presidential dominance, institutional reform centered on the responsible Prime Minister system is indispensable. Such reform would advance the dispersion of political power and the realization of responsible government, thereby contributing to the stability and maturity of Korean democracy.