신세대 양자간 및 지역 무역협정에서 국유기업에 대한 규제

While private enterprises (private companies) ultimately aim to maximize profits, public enterprises (SOEs) are characterized by pursuing political objectives as well. For example, SOEs can provide services such as electricity, gas, telecommunications, and postal services to the public at low costs. The state may also continue to provide such services to pursue industrial and trade policies, such as protecting key national industries from foreign competitive pressures. Strategic considerations often play a significant role in this process. To achieve these objectives, the state often grants SOEs privileges typically reserved for private enterprises. These privileges can be financial in nature, such as tax breaks or direct government subsidies. SOEs often have the opportunity to refinance at below-market rates from state-owned banks. Furthermore, SOEs often enjoy regulatory advantages, such as monopolies or by avoiding strict legal requirements. Problems arise when SOEs compete with private enterprises while pursuing profit, as SOEs can often offer services at lower prices than private enterprises. The reason why state-owned enterprises (SOEs) enjoy an advantageous market position is not due to better services, superior efficiency, or improved technology, but rather to the intervention of state sovereignty. This distorts markets and inhibits trade, potentially leading to non-tariff trade barriers at the international level. Such state intervention in the spontaneous market order hinders the optimal allocation of resources and ultimately harms the public interest. Regarding these impacts of SOEs, this paper examines the provisions regarding SOEs under the WTO legal system. It then examines how the recently concluded agreement comprehensively regulating SOEs differs from existing WTO provisions and whether it can serve as an effective regulatory tool under international economic law.