경쟁과 AI 안전 조치의 조화 - 전문 정보 관련 AI 안전 조치를 중심으로 -

The rapid advancement of Artificial Intelligence (AI) technology has persistently raised concerns regarding the social risks that AI models and services might pose. To mitigate these concerns, AI developers implement technical and policy actions, collectively known as AI safety measures. Because these measures have traditionally been viewed as necessary and fundamental, limited scholarly attention has been directed toward how they function as a competitive factor in the market. This paper shifts focus from the currently competitive generative AI service market to a hypothetical discussion of how existing AI safety measures might influence future competition in this domain. This study first examines the AI technology market and the necessity of safety protocols. Following a detailed review of professional information(specifically in the medical, legal, and financial sectors), the analysis explores the risk that an overemphasis on AI safety—leading to restricted information output—could create an asymmetric competitive impact, potentially causing market tipping. To mitigate this risk, the paper compares and analyzes concrete alternatives for establishing pro-competitive AI safety standards. I argue that AI safety regulations implemented without considering competition could create an asymmetry in regulatory costs, potentially establishing an artificial barrier to entry. This scenario could lead to negative network effects for firms facing high compliance costs. Simultaneously, it may enable firms with lower compliance costs to secure market dominance through learning effects and, in some cases, create opportunities for anticompetitive behavior resulting from the regulation itself.