벤처캐피탈 투자와 코스닥 신규상장기업의 투자효율성

This study examines how venture capital (VC) equity ownership prior to IPOs affects the post-IPO investment efficiency of KOSDAQ-listed firms between 2002 and 2022. We present three main findings. First, we find that VC-backing alone shows limited effects on investment inefficiency. However, we identify an inverted U-shaped relationship between VC ownership and investment inefficiency. At lower ownership levels inefficiency increases, while beyond a certain threshold VCs exercise more effective monitoring and thereby improve efficiency. Second, we analyze the first and second years after IPO separately and find no significant VC effect in year T+1 due to mandatory lock-ups, but we observe a clear monitoring effect in year T+2 when shareholding reflects voluntary retention. Third, we strongly observe this non-linear relationship among general IPO firms, whereas for technology-special listings longer lock-up periods induce VCs to focus on long-term value creation and reduce inefficiency as ownership increases. In sum, investment efficiency of KOSDAQ firms depends on VC ownership levels and lock-up arrangements rather than mere VC participation. Our results suggest that when VCs hold sufficient equity they actively monitor management and facilitate efficient resource allocation and enhance firm value.