압수된 스마트폰에 저장된 전자정보에 관한 압수 효력과 재사용에 관한 소고

This study examines the limited effect of seizure and the admissibility of seized materials as evidence, with a focus on recent Supreme Court precedents. Traditionally, it was argued that lawfully seized evidence could be used to prove unrelated crimes. However, this paper analyzes representative cases on the premise of the concept of “limited effect,” which confines the evidentiary use of seized materials to crimes specified in the warrant. In particular, digital evidence contains vast amounts of personal and corporate information, and its use in investigations of unrelated offenses poses a heightened risk of fundamental rights violations. The Supreme Court has held that “the constitutional principle of warrant requirement under Article 12 of the Constitution and the statutory principle of compulsory disposition under Article 199(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act are fundamental principles of criminal procedure that govern not only the collection of evidence but also the use of evidence obtained through compulsory measures.” Accordingly, investigative authorities may neither seize evidence unrelated to the grounds stated in the warrant nor use it as proof of guilt in other cases without obtaining a separate warrant. By extending the principles of warrant requirement and statutory regulation of compulsory investigation from the stage of evidence collection to that of evidence use, the Court has strictly limited the admissibility of seized materials. In conclusion, this study clarifies the logical foundation of the limited effect of seizure and the admissibility of seized evidence, thereby contributing to the protection of fundamental rights and the legitimacy of criminal procedure.