금융회사 경영진 제재의 법리에 관한 연구

Sanctions against CEOs of large financial institutions like banks are not common, and it is rare for them to proceed to litigation. Nevertheless, the 2024 court ruling that finalized the cancellation of disciplinary actions against two bank presidents involved in the DLF (Derivative Linked Fund) incident became a significant catalyst for revising the Act on Corporate Governance of Financial Companies. However, the main argument is that even under the current legal framework, a comprehensive consideration of the basis for CEO responsibility and sanctions seems largely insufficient and requires further review. This paper examines the legal principles of CEO accountability by dividing cases into two categories: those where the CEO's own actions are in question, and those where the CEO is held responsible for the actions of other executives or employees. For each category, the current legal system and areas for improvement were reviewed. In the first category, when a CEO violates financial laws in connection with their duties, the system is relatively clear, though some ambiguities were identified. For violations of financial laws unrelated to their duties, there is no clear basis for sanctions. However, since there are cases where regulatory action is necessary, a review of the feasibility and criteria for such sanctions is needed. Even in cases of non-financial law violations, if the illegal act is related to their duties, a review of the form and basis for necessary supervisory measures is required, beyond simply requesting action from the relevant government agencies. Furthermore, while violations of non-financial laws unrelated to duties are not typically a concern for regulators, in cases that cause significant social controversy or trouble, some form of supervisory action may be necessary. However, there appears to be no institutional mechanism for this. The second category refers to cases where the CEO is held accountable as a manager. The lack of clarity in the law regarding this responsibility was the root cause of the DLF case. Although this issue has been substantially addressed by the revised Act on Corporate Governance of Financial Companies, limitations still seem to exist. It is argued that this issue could have been more simply resolved if the basis for managerial responsibility was not limited to violations of financial laws but was grounded in various duties and responsibilities related to business, including those under the Commercial Act. The revised act is expected to resolve many of these issues by explicitly requiring the inclusion of various related laws, such as the Commercial Act and the Criminal Act, in the “Map of Responsibilities.” However, it was pointed out that given the practical implementation of this system, there is still room for debate over legal accountability, necessitating special attention and caution during its operation.