사법부의 독립성에 대한 헌법적 검토 - 독립기관의 예산편성에 대한 행정부의 개입을 중심으로 -

This study examines the constitutional and legal issues surrounding the financial independence of the judiciary in South Korea, particularly in light of the judicial corruption scandal (commonly referred to as "Judicial Nongdan"). Focusing on the executive branch's involvement in budget formulation for the judiciary, the paper highlights how unilateral reductions and the lack of independent submission rights compromise judicial autonomy. The research underscores the structural limitations of the current budget system, wherein the judiciary’s budget requests are subject to review and revision by the Ministry of Economy and Finance before reaching the National Assembly. Judicial independence is a cornerstone of the principles of separation of powers and the rule of law. It must be guaranteed not only in organizational and personnel aspects but also in financial matters. Among these, financial autonomy is essential to ensure the stability of judges' tenure and the fairness of trials. However, South Korea's Constitution and relevant statutes do not explicitly recognize the judiciary's authority to independently draft and submit its budget, resulting in de facto control by the executive branch. Therefore, this paper compared legislation cases in major countries such as the United States, Germany, and Japan with the constitutional system to examine how the judiciary's right to budget is systematically guaranteed. In particular, the United States stipulates that the president submit the judiciary's budget request to Congress without amendment, and the German court's budget belongs to the Ministry of Justice, but independent institutions such as the Constitutional Court institutionalize the balance of responsibility while ensuring financial independence. In conclusion, the study suggests institutional reforms to reinforce the judiciary’s financial autonomy. These include legal mechanisms requiring the government to submit judicial budget requests to the National Assembly without amendment or to obtain consent from the judiciary when reducing its budget. Such measures would better reflect the constitutional principle of separation of powers and serve as a foundation for strengthening judicial independence and restoring public trust in the legal system.