헌법재판소와 국회 간 상호작용을 통한 의제설정과정으로서의 ‘대화’: 헌법불합치결정 이후 개정입법에 대한 경쟁위험분석

When the Constitutional Court prioritizes the legislation of a particular policy agenda,whether, when, and how the National Assembly would response? This study approaches theinteraction between the Constitutional Court and the National Assembly from the perspectiveof the agenda-setting process, thereby expanding the discussion of governance as dialogue,which has been limited to political science and law, to policy studies. I proposed the dialogueas agenda-setting process as a general model for the interaction between the ConstitutionalCourt and the National Assembly, and conducted a competitive risk analysis on the time andtypes of amending 239 legal provisions declared nonconforming to the Constitution by theConstitutional Court of Korea from 1989 to 2024. The results suggest the importance ofpolitical and institutional factors influencing the dialogue between the Constitutional Courtand the National Assembly, the strategy of advocacy groups that chose the ConstitutionalCourt among various policy venues and shifted to another venue, the National Assembly, stepby step, and ultimately the attitude of lawmakers in the National Assembly toward thedialogue that the advocacy groups has been initiated and later the Constitutional Courtinvited.